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The usual arguments against sanctions are threefold. First, sanctions never "work" but merely vent
frustration of the sanctioners or serve as symbol that at least something is being done about something
that shouldn't be done but is being done. Second, sanctions may "work" in some situations but
predicting such situations is not possible because of inadequate social science methodologies applied to
"lessons learned." Third, sanctions may work, but they hurt often blameless masses of people far more
than the guilty powers-that-be and, at times, may actually strengthen these powers.
Such arguments all may have some validity but share a crucial vulnerability based on an assumption of
functionalism. That is, all three arguments assume that the mere implementation of the sanctions over
some time interval at a certain degree of intensity will achieve some objective. However, how the
sanctions and their consequences are perceived by their immediate, proximal, and distal targets, as well
as by worldwide observers, significantly affect the sanctions' success. In other words, success can be
significantly related to public diplomacy, perception management, psychological operations, and other
information efforts related to the sanctions.
In this regard, Saddam Hussein has been very successful in reinforcing mass images of the Iraqi masses
being killed through sanctions and of other nation-state violators of various international laws not
experiencing sanctions. Supporters of sanctions against Iraq have been much less successful at
reinforcing mass images that Iraqi suffering and sanctions are due to Iraqi misbehavior. In contrast, the
converse applied concerning sanctions against the South African apartheid regime, and so did the
consequences. Here the sanctioners were adept at information management, the sanctioned not so.
It may be too late to recreate significant support for sanctions against Iraq. It's not too late to
comprehend and apply the psychological lessons learned to attenuate and reverse future examples of
egregious misbehavior. (See Cottrell, L. S., Jr. (1960). Social research and psychological warfare.
Sociometry, 23, 103-119; Friedman, T. (February 6, 2001). The war Saddam won. The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com; Heckert, D. A., & Gondolf, E. W. (2000). The effect of perceptions of sanctions
on batterer program outcomes. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 37, 369-391; Lewis, R.,
Dobash, R. P., Dobash, R. E., & Cavanagh, K. (2000). Protection, prevention, rehabilitation or justice?
Women's use of the law to challenge domestic violence. International Review of Victimology, 7, 179205; Psychological warfare. (1968). Science, 8, 12-15, 36; Richardson, D. R., & Green, L. R. (1999). Social
sanction and threat explanations of gender effects on direct and indirect aggression. Aggressive
Behavior, 25, 425-434.) (Keywords: Iraq, Perception Management, Sanctions, Saddam Hussein.)
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